

DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

1. For consideration of the IAC there is attached a draft letter to the National Security Council from the Director of Central Intelligence proposing revision of NSCID-1 which would clarify the authority for dissemination of national intelligence abroad. Representatives of the IAC agencies have agreed to the language of this letter and the proposed revision of NSCID-1, except as indicated in the bracketed proviso on the second page, the footnote to which indicates the views of the agency representatives.

2. The basis for this difference of views regarding this proviso is as follows: The President in 1946 issued a letter to the Secretary of State approving a policy for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments under the authority of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Mr. Byrnes' recommendation, the President's letter, the approved policy and the current sub-policies interpreting and elaborating the original are all set forth in MIC 206/29 issued by the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee, which was given the responsibility for implementing the President's directive. There was no disagreement among the IAC representatives that, both in 1946 and now, this arrangement is necessary and useful to insure proper control of the disclosure of military information which for convenience (mainly to the Defense Department) has been defined to include military intelligence. In discussing the proposed revision of NSCID-1 the question arose: In the case of military intelligence embedded in national intelligence how can we assure that the military intelligence will be subjected to the scrutiny required by the President's policy and its interpretation in MIC 206/29?

3. It has been pointed out that appropriate reference in the proposed NSCID revision to existing U. S. disclosure policy would forestall possible confusion. However, inasmuch as the Defense Department representatives on the Military Information Committee operate under the direction of the three Service Intelligence Chiefs and since these same Chiefs are members of the IAC, it would appear that IAC concurrence in the dissemination of a given piece of national intelligence to a foreign government would automatically imply adequate consideration of the MIC policy in respect of any military intelligence that was involved. The burden of the language therefore in the bracketed addition to the proposed revision has the effect of reminding the Chiefs of the Military Intelligence agencies that this screening of military intelligence against the existing guidance should take place.

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4. The inclusion of such a reminder in an NSCID is really a question of propriety because it does not have any effect upon the exercise of the responsibilities envisaged in the proposed revision. It is not foreseen that it would adversely affect the procedure of IAC concurrence in a proposed dissemination to a foreign government except in that case where great haste is required in the national interest. It is believed that even here there need be no delay even where an exception to existing MIC policy is necessary, inasmuch as the departments having the responsibility for approving a change in the MIC interpretation are present in the IAC, namely, State, G-2, ONI, and AFOIN.

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Secretary
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